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Having initiated reforms in its financial sector in late 1997, the government of Indonesia 
introduced a new central bank independence act in early 1999. The next task for the 
government of Indonesia is to devise a safety net system for the financial sector. This 
study draws essential lessons from the experiences of other countries to highlight a 
number of key challenges facing Indonesia, especially at early stages of designing its 
unified financial sector supervisory agency.  
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  With the creation of new financial instruments and services offered by various 
financial institutions, countries have found that boundaries between the different types of 
financial institutions such as banking, securities, and insurance have blurred (Taylor and 
Fleming (1999)). In their study of 14 countries, Martinez and Rose (2003) find that at the 
end of 2001, the market shares of financial conglomerate in the banking sector, the 
securities industry and the insurance industry had significantly and rapidly climbed to 
around 71 percent, 63 percent and 70 percent, respectively.
1 The increasing presence 
of financial conglomerates is also highly visible in major Southeast Asian economies.
2 
The role of bancassurance (whereby commercial banks actively distribute insurance 
products as well) for instance has seen a phenomenal growth as a result of broad-based 
financial deregulation in a large number of Asian economies. By 2006, bancassurance 
can potentially account for 13 percent of total premiums collected in Asia’s life insurance 
sector, and 6 percent of the non-life insurance sector (Sigma (2002)). 
As in neighboring economies, the commercial banks in Indonesia have also been 
permitted to play active roles in the security and insurance sectors (Table 1). While at 
present financial conglomerates in Indonesia are arguably still in an early stage, but by 
no means are they insignificant. By year end 2003, it is estimated that at least 10 banks 
deliver bancassurance with a potential market of around Rp 14 trillion, and at least 15 
banks offer mutual funds, mostly based on government bonds (Hidayat (2003)  and 
Table(2)).  It is estimated that up to June 2003, around 85 percent (or roughly Rp58 
trillion) of the mutual funds were sold via banking institutions.  
                                                 
1  Those countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
2 A financial conglomerate is defined as any group of companies under common control whose 
exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different 
financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance) (Martinez and Rose (2003).   
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As the role of financial conglomerates continues to rise, concerns become more 
apparent over the effectiveness of multiple regulatory and supervisory agencies (Taylor 
and Fleming (1999), Mwenda and Fleming (2001), and Claessens (2002)). Fragmented 
supervision bodies have been reported to be inept in forming an overall risk assessment 
of a financial conglomerate on a consolidated basis due partly to a range of sources of 
financial risks associated with each part of the institution. Abrams and Taylor (2000) for 
instance argue that while the supervision of banking and securities tend to focus on the 
risk associated with the asset side of the balance sheet, the financial risk for the 
insurance company occurs mostly from the liabilities side of the balance sheet.  
Consequently, an integrated financial sector supervision body –in which banking, 
securities and insurance regulation is combined within a single institution— has 
emerged as a preferred choice to deal with a complex financial system. At the end of 
2002, Martinez and Rose (2003) reported that at least 22 countries have adopted an 
integrated single supervisory agency (Table 3). The Scandinavian economies (namely 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden) were the first to establish their integrated supervision 
agencies starting between 1986 -1991.
3 The creation of the Financial Supervisory 
Authority in the United Kingdom was announced in 1997. As a consequence of the 
country’s restructuring process of its financial sector following the break of the financial 
crisis in late 1997, Korea consolidated all its supervisory agencies for bank and non-
bank institutions, securities and futures markets, and insurance into a single supervisory 
board (the Financial Supervisory Service) on January 1, 1999. The most recent 
examples of countries adopting a single supervisory body are Estonia, Germany, Ireland 
and Malta in 2002. Highlighting further the rising importance of this unified supervisory 
approach, an informal club of “integrated supervisors ---comprising representatives from  
 
                                                 
3 Norway was the first to establish an integrated supervisory agency in 1986, followed by Denmark 
in 1988 and Sweden in 1991.    
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Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and  
the UK--- met in Sydney, Australia in early May 1999 for the first time. 
As in all of the 1997 financial crisis-effected economies in East Asia, a few key 
reform commitments have been pushed forward in Indonesia, including a plan to 
establish a single financial supervisory broad. Presently, the functions of regulation and 
supervision of the financial sector in Indonesia are shared among different institutions. 
The central bank as stated in Article 8 of Law no. 23/1999 is responsible for the tasks of 
regulating and supervising the banking sector. The ministry of finance is responsible for 
the insurance sector. The stock exchange is under the direct supervision of its own 
Capital Market Supervision Authority (BAPEPAM).   
The new supervisory institution will undoubtedly alter the landscape of the 
financial safety net system of the country in the near future. The official target date for 
the establishment of the single supervisory agency is no later than December 2010.  
Clearly, this is a mammoth task for the country to deliver within a relatively short period 
of time. The objective of this paper is to identify selected key potential challenges 
associated with the initial design process of the integrated financial sector supervisory 
board in Indonesia.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will 
briefly review a number of key aspects behind an integrated financial supervisory 
agency. Sections 3-6 present selected main challenges in the process to establish and 
to operate the single financial supervisory agency in Indonesia. Brief concluding remarks 
end the paper.      
 
2.  Single Supervisory Agency: brief overviews 
Before we jump directly to the Indonesian case, this section highlights some issues 
behind the on-going strategic debate between the proponents and opponents of a single 
supervisor. Some of these fundamental matters underlined in the debate will provide    
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guidelines for our analyses of the Indonesian case to be presented in subsequent 
sections.  
 
2.1  Proponents of a single supervisor 
Several essential arguments are made in favor and against a single supervisory 
agency. In brief, the proponents of a single supervisory body underline the economies-
of-scale and the improvement in the overall comprehensive monitoring of different 
financial institutions. The economies of scale can be achieved through centralized 
regulatory functions that permit the development of joint administrative, information 
technology, and other support functions (Taylor and Fleming (1999)). In most countries 
where there are few qualified personnel, a single supervisory agency should benefit 
from the pooling of all available skilled personnel. 
The growing number of financial conglomerates providing financial services 
across different segments of the financial industry (banking, securities and insurance for 
instance) poses enormous and complex challenges for supervisory authorities, both in 
developing and developed markets. Having all supervision responsibilities under “one-
roof”, the single agency can arguably better understand the risk arising not only in a 
single financial sector, but also amongst multi-sector financial intermediaries within the 
entire financial sector. Martinez and Rose (2003) have further argued that, under a 
system of multiple supervisory bodies, accountability may be easily diffused in cases of 
regulatory failure at any of the independent supervisory agencies, and that a lack of 
harmonization in the regulations and in their implementation across institution may arise. 
However, a single supervisory agency is able to monitor the financial system as a whole, 
and minimize regulatory arbitrage by applying a consistent approach to regulation and 
supervision across all segments of the financial system. 
 
2.2  Potential shortcomings of a Single Supervisory Agency    
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  There are at least three general concerns have been expressed against the 
establishment of a single supervisory agency. First, the success of a single supervisory 
agency is highly depended upon the strength of the pre-existing multiple supervisory 
agencies.  Abrams and Taylor (2000) argue that to be effective, the newly established 
supervisory institution needs to emulate/reflect the structure of the sectors that it 
supervises. Hence, unless independent and effective supervisory agencies have been 
well established for each segment of the financial system, the merging of these 
institutions into one will not necessarily improve the supervision and regulation of the 
financial sector of the economy. In a similar vein, Martinez and Rose (2003) argue that it 
is imperative to address weaknesses of supervision and regulation at various levels of 
the financial system before even discussing the number of agencies that should 
supervise the financial system. It is also important to note that the integration process 
should be done only when the financial system is stable. 
Second, at early stages of the transition from multiple agencies to a single one, 
the past experiences of countries listed in (Table 3) shows that they consistently had 
initially lower supervisory effectiveness. Martinez and Rose (2003) find a wide range of 
practical problems, including aspects such as legal constraints, personnel, integration of 
the information technology system, and budgetary issues that will slow down the 
establishment of the supervisory agency and that will lengthen the transition stage of the 
single institution. Based upon their studies of several countries, dealing with the 
operational tasks to carry out integration can require at a minimum around 2 years, 
depending critically on conditions in each country. 
Third, the establishment of a single supervisory agency can result in a 
bureaucratic entity unable to rapidly respond to market developments. Reddy (2001) 
observes that the unification could lead to lack of clarity in functioning due to different 
objectivities associated with different supervisory roles. This objective may be depositor 
protection for banks vs. investor protection for capital markets vs. consumer protection    
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for other financial institutions (Milo (2002)). Furthermore, the operation of a single 
agency eliminates the system of checks and balances available under the multiple 
agencies system, hence leading to a concentration of power (Goodhart (2001) and 
Barth et.al (2002)).  
  
3.  The Central Bank Law no.23/1999: pushing for an independent Bank 
Indonesia 
Arguably, one of the cornerstones of the post-1997 crisis reforms on the 
regulation and supervision of the financial sectors in Indonesia is the enactment of the 
Central Bank Law no. 23 in May 1999 ---henceforth Law No.23/1999--- and its 
subsequent amendments. As specified in Articles 7, 8 and 9 of Law No. 23/1999, its 
primary objective is to provide a legal structure whereby the central bank can act 
independently in carrying out its duties as the monetary policy maker.
4  
The Law no.23/1999 also clearly specifies that Bank Indonesia will eventually 
relinquish its role in bank supervision. In an amendment passed in December 2003, a 
target date of December of 2010 is set as the latest date for the separation of banking 
supervision authority from the central bank. As stated in Article 34 and 35 of Law no. 
23/1999, a new independent financial supervisory institution will be established. In fact, 
article no.34 initially had specified that the timetable for the establishment of this 
independent institution should be no later than December 31, 2002, but the date has 
now been postponed to December 2010. With the Law no.23/1999, Indonesia will follow 
the steps taken by countries such as South Korea and the United Kingdom where the 
central bank will no longer have any supervisory responsibility. The new single 
supervisory agency in Indonesia will not be under the authority of Bank Indonesia.  
 
                                                 
4 Refer to Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) for further discussions on the arguments for and 
against the separation between supervision and monetary policy.    
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4.  Gradual Approach to Establishing a Single Supervisory Agency 
The Central Bank Law of 1999 provided the initial impetus to the establishment 
of the single supervisory authority in Indonesia. One immediate question then is how 
quickly should Indonesia establish its single supervisory agency?   Two contrasting 
approaches have been taken and are worth highlighting here. The first one is the 
“gradualist” approach of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden). In 
sharp contrast, the United Kingdom and South Korea adopted a “Big-Bang” approach.   
In its response to the country’s financial crisis in late 1997, the Korean 
government integrated the supervisory roles of all financial intermediaries within a fairly 
short period of two years. On January 1, 1999, the Office of Bank Supervision, the 
Securities Supervisory Board, the Insurance Supervisory Board and the Non-bank 
Supervisory Board were consolidated into a single supervisory body as the Financial 
Supervisory Service, the executive arm of the Financial Supervisory Commission.  
For Indonesia, we strongly recommend the gradualist approach strategy where a two 
stage approach should be adopted. The immediate task is to improve the current 
supervisory agencies in the financial sector. In the second stage, the “integration” 
process of the supervisors should also be carefully managed. The following sections 
further discuss the two-stage approach. 
 
4.1  Improving the strength of the pre-existing supervisory agencies 
  The new integrated supervisory agency may organize its departments according 
to the type of financial intermediaries it supervises (Martinez and Rose (2003)). 
Essentially, this new institution merges together the multiple supervisory agencies and 
standardizes the rules and regulations on the supervisory activities. Therefore, the 
establishment of a single supervisory agency in covering all segments of the financial 
industry will not be effective at all, unless the country has already established well-run 
multiple agencies supervising each component of the financial market. If the supervision    
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of the financial institutions is poor under multiple agencies, it will continue to be weak 
under a unified agency.   
With the objectives to strengthen the domestic banking sector and the 
supervision capacity, a number of new regulations have been passed since 1999 (Table 
4). Similarly, a decree issued by the Jakarta Stock Exchange no. 315/2000, which was 
then amended by the decree No. 339/2001, beefed up the listing requirement by 
demanding listing company to have independent commissioner, audit committee, and 
corporate secretary.
5 In November 2002, the BAPEPAM issued its decree No. 20/2002 
concerning independence of accountant of publicly listed companies in carrying out 
auditing services. However despite the long list of new regulations and decrees, they 
have been poorly enforced.    
The scandal involving Lippo Bank in late 2002 and early 2003 highlight the 
deficient quality of the supervisory agencies, including Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and the Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory 
Board  (Bapepam). In late 2002, Lippo issued two different and confliciting third quarter 
financial reports. The first listed the bank’s total assets as 24 trillion rupiah and its net 
profit as around 98 billion rupiah; but the second stated that the total assets had fallen to 
22.8 trillion rupiah and that the bank profits were actually a net loss of approximately 1.3 
trillion rupiah (MacIntyre and Resosudarmo (2003)). Furthermore, there were also some 
concerns on the non-transparent sale of the bank’s assets that had been taken over by 
IBRA.  
In October 2003, Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), a major state bank, was 
reported to have experienced a loss of around 1.7 trillion rupiah having issued fraudulent 
Letters of Credit for fictitious transactions involving exports. The scandal highlights the 
lack of internal control between branches and poor governance in the state-owned 
                                                 
5  The main responsibility of the corporate secretary is to keep informed about capital market 
regulations, to provide public information on the company’s condition, to give advice to the    
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banks. The closures of Bank Dagang Bali and Bank Asiatic in early 2004, unearthed 
another examples of moral hazard practices, such as related party lending, fabrication of 
asset records, and fictitious credit records, in the banking industry. 
To improve the banking supervision, the adoption of the Basle II Framework 
endorsed in June 26, 2004 by the central bank governors and the heads of bank 
supervisory authorities in the Group of Ten (G10) countries, should be considered in 
Indonesia. The Basle II framework improved further the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and 
its 1996 supplement by introducing three pillars to strengthen the stability of the financial 
sector. The first pillar revises the 1998 Accord’s guidelines by aligning the minimum 
capital requirements more closely to each bank’s actual risk of economic loss. The 
second pillar recognizes the necessity of exercising effective supervisory review of 
banks’ internal assessments of their overall risks. The last pillar leverages the ability of 
market discipline to motivate prudent management by enhancing the degree of 
transparency in banks’ public reporting.  
 
4.2  Integration process: harmonizing supervision practices 
  Once the performance of different supervisory agencies has been improved, the 
next stage is the integration process of the agencies. As briefly discussed in section 2, it 
is pertinent for the unified supervisory body to have an in-depth understanding of the 
different objectives and practices associated with supervising different groups of 
financial institutions. In a country where banks dominate the financial sector such as in 
Indonesia, an ill-prepared supervisory agency may focus its resources on the banking 
sector at the expense of not sufficiently supervising the other financial institutions. Lack 
of an overall appreciation of the financial industry on the part of the new supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                   
directors in complying with capital market regulations, and to liaise between the company and its 
stakeholders.     
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agency may eventually impair the ability to communicate to the markets its objectives 
and policies.       
An adequate grasp of all the tasks associated with the different supervisory roles 
is necessary for the unified agency to implement a harmonized set of supervisory 
practices. One possible approach to achieve this is through a gradual integrating 
process of the agencies.  A number of countries have adopted a semi-unification 
strategy approach, where one agency supervises two types of financial intermediaries 
initially (Rose and Martinez (2002)). Malaysia and Australia for instance unified banking 
and insurance supervision responsibilities. Switzerland and Finland integrated the 
supervision of the banks and the securities firms. South Africa and Chile unified the 
supervision of the security and insurance firms.    
The objective of this partial unification approach is to let the market conditions 
influence the unification process. The strong growth of bancassurance in the 
Scandinavian economies during early 1980s was a powerful reason for creating an 
integrated supervision agency. This model seems more appealing in Indonesia, where 
banks are by far the largest segment of the financial sector and are launching insurance 
products, largely facilitated by relatively loose regulations on ownership of banks and 
insurers (Table 5). Given that the same phenomena is taken place now in Indonesia, it is 
a natural intermediate step for the country to consider merging its banking and 
insurance supervision before moving to a fully unified supervisory system.   
In short, the failure to develop a unified regulatory and supervisory framework for 
the financial sector is likely to slowdown or even to prevent the integration process of the 
former multiple supervisory agencies. The longer the “gradual integrating” processes 
occur before the target date of 2010, the more prepared the unified agency will be to 
assume its responsibilities at the schedule date.          
 




To be effective, a supervisory agency must be able to take decisions and carry 
out its duties without undue outside interference whether it be from ministers, 
parliamentarians, industry leaders, or other government officials. The lack of 
independence of the supervisory agencies has long been a problem in Indonesia.  
Despite its relatively long tenure as the banking sector supervisory agency, Bank 
Indonesia capacity to supervise and regulate the banking sector was significantly 
undermined by its lack of independence prior to the enforcement of Law no. 23/1999. 
Between 1983 and 1999, the central bank was part of the government, and the 
Governor of Bank Indonesia was given the status of a Cabinet Minister.  Under this 
structure, the central bank was only a member of the Monetary Board, consisting of 
several economic ministers with the Minister of Finance as the chairman. This board 
oversaw the overall conduct of monetary policy and financial sector supervision.
6 
During this period prior to passage of Law no.23/1999, the authority of Bank 
Indonesia to supervise and regulate the banking sector was severely limited. Bank 
Indonesia had the responsibility to review new proposals for bank licenses, but not to 
issue the permits (Djiwandono (1999)). Similarly, the central bank could comment upon 
or even suggest changes in policies affecting the banking sector, such as raising the 
compulsory reserve requirements, but the Monetary Board would eventually decide 
whether or not to fully implement the proposed policy change. The lack of independence 
and full authority for the central bank to regulate and supervise the banking sector also 
arguably explains the poor handling of the closure of 16 banks in late 1997 and 
destabilizing events that took place immediately after that.
7    
                                                 
6  In this period banks accounted for over 90 percent of financial assets and liabilities. Insurance 
was dominated by state enterprises (JAMSOSTEK) and securities firms were just beginning to 
grow. 
7  See Djiwandono (1999). 
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As has also been the experiences of other economies, there are a number of 
impediments to assemble an independent supervisory board. Two of the most important 
impediments are the weak legal system and the budgetary constraints facing the 
government and the supervisory agency. 
  
5.1.1  Legal and Political constraints 
  5.1.1.1 Legislative requirement 
A new law on the single supervisory board should be prepared and eventually be 
passed by the Indonesian parliament well before the target operational date of 2010. 
This new law needs to explicitly and elaborately lay out the objectives of the new agency 
and the scope of its authority to enforce effectively its regulations. The agency should 
have at a minimum the power to require information from financial firms, and to assess 
the competence and integrity of senior management and the owners of various financial 
institutions.   
Ideally, the supervisory board should also be able to take appropriate sanctions 
against failures to comply with regulatory rules, including having the ultimate authority to 
revoke licenses to conduct financial activities. Alternatively, if the “regulatory power” is 
going to be separated from the supervisory authority, a close cooperation between the 
two institutions is imperative. We cannot have a case where the regulatory institution(s) 
would undermine the credibility of the supervisory board. Abrams and Taylor (2000) 
rightfully argue that under this separation case, the regulatory body must respond 
promptly to recommendations provided by the supervisory board. If the board’s decision 
is not acted upon, the regulatory body is required to provide proper reasons in a timely 
fashion. 
Although the scope of the new law should be as comprehensive as possible, it is 
imperative to leave some room for amendments, especially regarding the details of the 
operations of the supervisory agency. For instance, the supervisory board should always    
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be in a position to respond promptly to market innovations. To ensure that the 
supervisory (and regulatory) power of the board is up to date to deal with sea changes in 
the financial sector, periodic review and amendment of the law will be required.  
 
5.1.1.2 Political Interference 
The strongest guarantee of agency independence in three Scandinavian 
countries is the transparency of the political process (Taylor and Fleming (1999)). The 
lack of an established and mature political system in a country often leads to incidences 
of interference that compromise the independence of the supervisory agencies. Lessons 
from recent experiences in the restructuring process of the banking sector in Indonesia 
should provide a clear message on the cost of political intervention. Fane and McLeod 
(2002) and Enoch et.al (2001) illustrate that government officials often do not have 
strong incentives to ensure the best outcome from the restructuring process. Quintyn 
and Taylor (2002) argue that political interference by the Financial Sector Action 
Committee (FSCA), comprised of a number of economic ministers under the 
coordinating minister, during the Habibie presidency, have often led to non-uniform 
application of the rules and the treatment received by the restructured banks.  
In a similar vein, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has proven 
vulnerable to outside political pressures. During its term (1998-2004), the restructuring 
agency has had 7 heads, and also had moved between two ministries (the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises). Needless to say that for the new 
supervisory agency to work effectively, its senior management must be protected from 
arbitrary removal. 
 
5.1.2  Budgetary Constraints    
  Another key impediment to independence is on budgetary. To attain quality staff, 
the supervisory board must compete with the private sector. The supervisory authority    
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must also have adequate resources to ensure timely and effective data collection and 
processing. Therefore the pressing issue here will be on the financing side of the 
operations of the single supervisory board.  
Looking at the experiences of other countries, we again find no single successful 
approach to the budgetary issue. However, two contrasting approaches are worth 
discussing. The Financial Service Authority in the United Kingdom is funded entirely 
through an industry levy. In contrast, the principle sources of funds for the Financial 
Supervisory Service in Korea are mixed of appropriations from the government, the 
bank of Korea (the country’s central bank), and the financial institutions under its 
authority.  
For Indonesia, we recommend a two-stage approach. The Korean approach of 
financing the supervisory authority could be adopted at the initial stage of operations. 
Obviously, too much reliance on the funding from either the government or the central 
bank may expose the supervisory authority to political interference. Hence, we would 
emphasize here that the contribution of the government and the central bank should not 
be the major part of the fund and in anycase should be phased out gradually. There 
should be a timetable for the supervisory agency to move away from the mixed-
financing approach in the direction of the UK system, i.e. a total reliance on an industry 
levy. Given the importance of this budgetary issue, it is also strongly recommended that 
this matter will be well specified in the new Law on the supervisory authority.      
 
5.2 Accountability 
The need for supervisory independence should be balanced by the 
corresponding requisite that the agency be held accountable for its policies and actions. 
In the past, we have seen how the action of the supervisory agencies in Indonesia had  
substantial impacts on the market (especially the financial industry), the overall 
macroeconomic policies of the government and even the political environment.    
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Therefore, it is imperative that a committee consisting of representatives from the 
financial industry, the government, the central bank and the parliament be established to 
periodically evaluate the performance of the supervisory authority.  
    
6.  Strengthening Supporting Infrastructure in the Financial Sector 
  The experiences of other countries have shown that the effectiveness of a single 
supervisory authority is likely to be very low during an initial transition period. Weak 
supervision in turn will likely raise opportunities for potentially risky activities by financial 
institutions. As evidenced in many crisis-effected East Asian economies, including 
Indonesia, there are a number of incentives for weak financial institutions to expand their 
exposure to risky projects once they are fully protected under various restructuring 
schemes introduced at the early stages of a financial crisis. This situation, therefore, 
leads us to further emphasize the need to strengthen the supporting infrastructure prior 
to the establishment of a single supervisory agency. The sub-sections discuss what this 
entails. 
 
6.1  Moving Away From Blanket Protection to a Compulsory Deposit Insurance 
Scheme. 
In late January 1998, the government of Indonesia, in an effort to restore 
confidence in the banking sector, issued a blanket guarantee of all deposits and other 
liabilities of the domestic banking system. Although the initial target was to terminate the 
guarantee scheme by the end of January 2000, the facility continued to be extended 
well beyond the targeted timetable.
8  
Moral hazard is a danger whenever the government provides any form of 
“guarantee” or deposit insurance. The blanket guarantee provided incentives for the 
owners and the management of the domestic banks to continue to absorb deposits from    
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the market and use them to finance risky projects undertaken either by firms in the 
same group or by unrelated firms (Fane and McLeod (2002)). With a relatively low CAR 
requirement (of around 4 percent), the common risky practices of the domestic banks 
exposed the government in particular and the economy in general to a new round of 
massive potential losses in the banking sector, and shifted the burden from creditors 
(depositors) to the tax payers. 
Hence, it is imperative that a transparent and self-funded scheme of deposit 
insurance be established. There have been initial efforts by the Ministry of Finance to 
gradually establish the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). A draft Law of Deposit 
Insurance Corporation was submitted to the Parliament in September 2003. It is 
expected that the deposit insurance system becomes operational in 2005. Familiarity 
with the operations of the DIA should provide valuable input to the future establishment 
of a single supervisory agency. On the other hand, a poorly designed deposit insurance 
scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detriagache (2002)). 
While waiting for the DIA, it is recommended that the scope of coverage of the 
present blanket guarantee system be reduced as in the case of Thailand. The coverage 
limit in that country was first set at 50 million baht per depositor per financial institution, 
but it was then gradually reduced to 20 million baht to one million baht per depositor per 
financial institution under the government plan, known as the limited deposit insurance 
system. Furthermore, the full guarantee accorded to creditors of financial institutions 
was removed in November 2003 
 
6.2 Settlement  System 
The payments or settlement system basically consists of the commercial banks 
and the central bank. In this system, transactions for payment and delivery within the 
                                                                                                                                                   
8  At the time of writing this paper (August 2004), the blanket guarantee remains in place.    
19
 
commercial banks take place and the central bank is responsible to oversee and settle 
net final transactions. By the nature of the operation of the payments system, the spread 
of systemic risk in the financial sector lies in the failure of the settlement and payments 
system.  In general, there are two types of risks in the payments system. First is credit 
risk, wherein a counter-party could not fulfill its liabilities upon maturity and thereafter. 
Second is liquidity risk, wherein the counter-party could not make payment in full upon 
maturity, but only afterwards.  
Up to early 2001, the settlement system in Indonesia was primarily accomplished 
under the Net Settlement System. In that system, the final completion process of the 
payment settlements at the end of a period is achieved by offsetting total payables 
against total receivables, hence there will only be one net receivable or payable to be 
settled for each participant account. Under this system, the receiving banks will be 
exposed to both credit and liquidity risks of the sending banks (Kobayakawa (1997)). 
A real-time gross settlement system (RTGS) treats and immediately deals with 
each transaction of any participant account individually (not in a total lump-sum). The 
system will allow (suspend) any transaction/payment of a bank to a recipient bank only 
when its balance is adequate (not adequate). Given the operation of the RTGS in real 
and continuous time, the system can reduce both types of payment risks. In short, it 
forces the participant banks to have adequate liquidity if any of them wants to do the 
transaction. For the supervisory agencies, the Lender of Last Resort, the Deposit 
Insurance Agency and the Monetary Authority, a well functioning RTGS will  
provide them immediate information on the liquidity condition of the market.   
In late 2000, Bank Indonesia introduced the Bank Indonesia-Real Time Gross 
Settlement System. This facility should play a key role in the overall success of the 
operation of the financial safety net system in the country. Equally important, smooth  
and credible operation of the RTGS should enhance the overall liquidity of the financial 
sector.       
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6.3  The Judicial System     
  One of the most important components necessary in implementation of credible 
supervision of the financial sector is a well functioning legal system. The reform of the 
legal system has, in fact, been at the heart of the debate on the agenda of political and 
economic reform in the country in the post-crisis period. Legal reform has the objective 
of hastening and ensuring the success of the restructuring process of the financial and 
corporate sectors. The Amendment to the 1905 Bankruptcy code signed in April 22, 
1998 for instance was hailed as one of the vital reform measures. The implementation of 
the law, however, has so far been a disappointment. Lender/investor confidence has 
been damaged rather than improved by outcomes of cases in the commercial courts.  
  The high-profile controversy over the Commercial Court’s bankruptcy ruling on 
the PT Asuransi Jiwa Manulife Indonesia (AJMI), for instance, underscored the need for 
an acceleration of legal reforms. AJMI dodged possible bankruptcy when a three-judge 
panel on August 23, 2001 threw out a case brought by the disgruntled beneficiary of an 
unpaid insurance policy for a mere 50 million rupiah, compared to the total assets of 
AJMI of around 2.1 trillion rupiah at that time (McBeth (2001)).   
  The number of cases of wealthy businesspeople who have escaped through 
official negligence continues to rise in Indonesia. The latest one is the case of Adrian 
Waworuntu, the business consultant from Gramarindo, who is likely to be charged with 
purposely evading the law after having embezzled Rp 1.7 trillion allegedly in collusion 
with state-owned Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) through the issuance of fraudulent 
Letters if Credit (The Jakarta Post (2004)). 
In general, the crucial absence of a law of contempt; pervasive corruption among 
law enforcers including police, court officials and judges all the way to the members of 
parliament, mean judgments are rarely implemented (Lev (1998), Lindsey (1998) and 
Siregar (2001)). Therefore, one vital factor in any plan to improve the legal system in 
Indonesia is the political commitment of all offices of the government and the parliament.    
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Ironically, a Presidential Election Bill passed by the House of Representatives in July 
2003, facilitates the candidacy of citizens with the status of defendant in running for 
president or vice president. This underlines further the questionable commitment that 
the country has in reforming its legal structures.
9   
 
7.  Brief Concluding Remarks 
The operations of regulatory and supervisory institutions have been shown to 
have significant implications for the recovery process since the 1997-1998 financial 
crisis for most of the affected economies in East Asia (Lindgren et.al (1999), Pangestu 
and Habir (2002), and Quintyn and Taylor (2002)). In Indonesia, weak and poorly 
designed regulatory and supervisory boards have consistently been underlined as one 
of the primary contributing factors to the slow and costly restructuring process of the 
financial sector. The outcome of recent efforts by the government of Indonesia to reform 
existing institutions and to design much-needed additional infrastructure in the financial 
safety net system is therefore going to be critical in shaping the future landscape and 
stability of the domestic financial sector. 
The objective of this study is to highlight a number of primary challenges to the 
establishment of a single supervisory agency in Indonesia. The list of issues discussed 
in the paper is not meant to be exhaustive, and obviously more studies are needed in 
the future. However, there are several issues we wish to re-emphasize as concluding 
remarks for the paper. 
The first and foremost is that the establishment of a single supervisory agency 
will not automatically resolve the past problems associated with multiple supervisory 
agencies. Simply changing the structure of the supervisory system will not correct the 
problems with prudential and market conduct standards, surveillance and enforcement.  
                                                 
9  See “Presidential election law reflects democratic flaws: Assembly speaker”, The Jakarta Post, 
July, 7, 2003.    
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The single supervisory agency is not “a quick fix” tool to address the weakness 
of supervision of financial intermediaries in Indonesia. Experiences of other countries 
have shown that making the decision to move to an integrated agency is the easiest part 
of the process. The actual implementation is going to be the most difficult part.  
Furthermore, the risk of the supervisory agency becoming a powerful tool that 
may be exploited by the incumbent government or political party is very real in 
Indonesia. The supervisory role of the central bank was one avenue for direct 
intervention by the government in various aspects of the banking sector, especially 
before and during the 1997 financial crises.  Similarly, there are also much to be learnt 
from the recent episodes of “political interference” over the operation of the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).  
Finally, the plan to adopt a unified supervisory agency must come with a 
commitment to proceed with a much wider scope of economic, judicial and political 
reforms in the country. The deadline of 2010 for this mammoth task is indeed an 
ambitious one. However, it does not mean that the country should necessarily abandon 
its plan to establish a unified supervisory agency. The reform process in the country will 
continue well beyond 2010. However to help raise the credibility of the single supervisory 
agency, at a minimum there should be compelling evidence that structural reforms are 
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Permitted for both 
Universal and 
Commercial Banks with 
limitations 
 
Permitted with limitations 
for Universal banks only 
 















Banks may hold 
equity participation 
in stockbrokering 




banks may own insurance 
companies with MAS 
approval 
 
Limited in the aggregate 
to 20% of bank’s capital 
 
Interests in the excess of 10%, or that give 
the bank significant influence over the 
management of a company, require 
regulatory approval. In addition, a bank may 
not invest more than 2% of its capital funds 
in any individual firm. 
 
N/A: No information is available yet  (to be confirmed); 1/ Securities activities include underwriting, daling and brokering all kinds of securities and 
all aspects of the mutual fund business; 2/ Insurance activities include underwriting and selling insurance principal and as agent ; 3/ Real estate 
activities include real estate investment, development and management; 4/ Including investments through holding company structures. 
 
Sources: Claessens (2002); Bank of Thailand Reports (Various Years); Bank of Indonesia (various reports), Milo (2004).    
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Bank International Indonesia; Bank Negara Indonesia Lippo Bank Bank Danamon; Bank Niaga; 
Bank Pan International (Panin Bank); Bank Central Asia Bank Mandiri, Standard Chartered 





Maybank; Affin Bank; Bumiputra-Commerce Bank; Southern Bank;Citibank (Malaysia); HSBC 




Bank of the Philippine Island; Philippine National Bank; Allied Bank; Equitable PCI Bank; BDO 





Bangkok Bank; Kasikorn Bank; The Siam Commercial Bank; Bank of Ayudhya; The Thai Military 
Bank;Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank; Bank of Asia; UOB Radanasin Bank; DBS Thai 
Danu Bank; Krung Thai Bank; Bangkok Metropolitan Bank; Siam City Bank and Bank Thai. 
 
 
Source:  Various websites of the listed banks and the central banks of the countries. 
 
1/ By end 2003, it is estimated that at least 10 banks deliver bancassurance with the potential market at around Rp 14 trillion, and at 
least 15 banks offering mutual funds, mostly based on government bonds (Hidayat (2003)).  It is estimated that up to June 2003, 
around 85 percent (or roughly Rp58 trillion) of the mutual funds were sold via banking institutions.    
 
**/ For each of the banks listed, we examine the list of products and services that the intermediaries provided. In each of them, we 
find at least an insurance product or an investment product, or both being offered by the banks. 
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21. United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
 
22. United Kingdom 
 





Selected Newly Introduced Rules on the Banking Sector Since 1999 
 
 
1). Requiring banks to appoint Compliance Directors, responsible for ensuring 
the banks’ compliance with existing regulations (BI regulation No. 1/6/1999) 
 
2). Strengthening legal lending limit regulation (BI regulation No. 2/16/2000)  
 
3). Submission of the quarterly and annual financial report to Bank Indonesia 
(circular letter No. 3/30-31/2003). 
 
4). Application of risk management for commercial banks (BI regulation No. 
5/8/2003). 
 
5). Implementation of Know Your Customer Principle (BI regulation No. 
5/21/2003). 
 
6). Enhancing the competence and integrity of bankers by imposing a Fit and 
Proper Test on each bank’s shareholders and management (BI regulation No. 
5/25/2003). 
 
7). Strengthening Bank Indonesia Supervisory function and the status of bank 
(BI regulation No. 6/9/2004). 
 




Source: Bank Indonesia Website (www.bi.go.id) 
 
 
 Table 5: Ownership Regulations governing banks and Insurers 
 
Countries  Maximum % of 
bank’s shares held 
by insurers 
Maximum % of 
insurer’s shares 
held by banks 
Creation of banking 
subsidiaries by 
insurers 
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